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THE TRANSNATIONAL

INSOLVENCY DILEMMA:

CONGRESS SHOULD EMiHAsIZE COMITY OF
NATIONS

I.

INTRODUCTION

The rise in the number of transnational insolvencies' is an inevitable
consequence of today's modem business world.2 With the proliferation of
complex, cross-border debtor-creditor relationships, U.S. practitioners and
parties to bankruptcy proceedings need to be assured of fair and impartial
administrations of insolvent estates. Unfortunately, § 304 of the Bankruptcy
Code3 offers no clear answers for American creditors with interests in foreign
insolvency proceedings. Instead, § 304(c) simply lists six factors4 that federal
courts should consider when deciding whether to grant an ancillary U.S.
bankruptcy proceeding. Because § 304(c) fails to make clear whether
international notions of comity' or the protection of domestic claim holders'

1. While a transnational insolvency can involve the attachment of an American debtor's
foreign assets by foreign creditors, this Note will focus on the impact of insolvency proceedings
involving American creditors who attempt to attach the domestic assets of a foreign debtor who
has filed for bankruptcy protection under the laws of a foreign country. For a practical approach
for today's bankruptcy practitioner in either type of situation, see Simon D. Haysom & Amelia
T. Damiani, Practitioner'sGuide to InternationalBankruptcy, N.Y. STATE B.J., Jan. 1996, at 42.
2. See Tandy Armstrong Panuska, Comment, The Chaos of International InsolvencyAchieving Reciprocal Universality Under Section 304 or MI1CA, 6 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 373, 374
(1993).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1994).
4. Those factors are:
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and
inconvenience in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of such
estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with
the order prescribed by [title 11];
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the
individual that such foreign proceeding concerns.
Id. § 304(c).
5. The Supreme Court first defined "comity" in 1895 in Hilton v Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895),
espousing that comity is
neither a matter of absolute obligation .... nor of mere courtesy and good
will .... But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory
to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due
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interests should control a court's decision of whether to grant an ancillary
proceeding, insolvent debtors and unpaid creditors can rarely be certain whether
a United States court will favor protecting local creditors or defer to a foreign
adjudication.
In this Note, Part II introduces the two approaches federal courts have
taken when deciding whether to grant relief to foreign representatives in a
transnational insolvency. In addition, this section will discuss how the 1978
Revised Bankruptcy Code has shifted modem courts towards a policy of
deferring to international notions of comity. Part III analyzes solutions
commentators have suggested to resolve the problems inherent in cross-border
insolvencies. Part IV proposes a revision of § 304(c) of the Revised Code. The
objective of this revision is to provide courts with a flexible framework that
will encourage deferral to foreign proceedings unless clear evidence of
prejudice can be shown. In addition to assuring all interested parties of
consistent, fair, and predictable administrations of insolvent estates, this
framework will enable American creditors to base lending and investment
decisions on the assumption that foreign debtors will not be subject to ancillary
U.S. proceedings unless the laws of the foreign debtor's country are clearly
prejudicial towards foreign creditors.
II. TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCIES UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1898
AND THE REVISED BANKRUPTCY CODE
Historically, U.S. courts have applied either a "universality" or "territoriality" approach when addressing transnational insolvencies.6 American
courts have applied either the universality or territoriality approach to decide
whether to allow a foreign jurisdiction to administer assets based in the United
States. Since the revision of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978,7 the trend has been

regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its
own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
Id. at 163-64; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990).
6. For an in-depth discussion of the case law outlining these two conflicting approaches, see,
for example, Charles D. Booth, Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: An Analysis and Critique
of the Inconsistent Approaches of United States Courts, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 135, 137-47 (1992).
See also Stuart A. Krause et al., Relief Under Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code: Clarifying the
Principal Role of Comity in Transnational Insolvencies, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2591 (1996)
(advocating an amendment to § 304 to emphasize comity as the determinant factor in a court's
analysis); Melissa S. Rirnel, Comment, American Recognition of International Insolvency
Proceedings: Deciphering Section 304(c), 9 BANKR. DEv. J. 453 (1992) (proposing a balancing
test approach to allow courts to properly weigh competing policy considerations); Barbara K.
Unger, United States Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies, 19 INT'L LAw. 1153 (1985)
(advocating a balancing test approach that emphasizes comity).
7. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-989, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended

at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994)).
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for courts to defer to notions of comity under the universality approach and
grant relief to foreign representatives who petition under the Code.8 However,
a minority of courts continue to follow the territoriality approach, insisting that
American claim holders' interests be protected in light of the possible
prejudices that could occur in a foreign bankruptcy proceeding.9 Because of
this split among federal courts, American creditors and foreign debtors cannot
be certain whether an American ancillary proceeding will be granted in the
event of insolvency.
A court adopting a universality approach would typically defer to the
foreign bankruptcy proceeding, respecting notions of international comity and
favoring a single distribution of assets by a foreign court. While the principal
advantage to the universality approach is the prospect of a single adjudication
that would equitably and efficiently dispose of all claims among all interested
creditors, this approach can jeopardize American creditors' interests by
subjecting them to the inconvenience and expense of asserting their claims in
distant forums, under foreign bankruptcy law.
In contrast, U.S. courts that follow a territorialistic approach often protect

the rights of American creditors by granting an ancillary bankruptcy proceeding.' ° The two primary advantages of the territoriality approach for American
creditors is the assurance that their claims will be considered under U.S.
bankruptcy law and that they are not inconvenienced by being forced to
adjudicate their claim in a foreign court." However, the territoriality approach
also promotes multiple insolvency proceedings and has done little to encourage
countries to work toward harmonizing inconsistent domestic bankruptcy
laws. 2 This resulting bankruptcy scheme increases the transaction costs of
doing business in today's increasingly interconnected global marketplace,
hampers the ability of lendors to accurately evaluate the risks of extending
credit to foreign multinationals, and fails to assure foreign debtors that they will
not be subject to multiple bankruptcy proceedings and conflicting judgments.
A. Early Case Law
Early American case law generally advocated a territoriality approach,
often denying recognition to foreign proceedings in order to protect American

8. See In re Hourani, 180 B.R. 58, 63-64 & n.10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also infra note
22.
9. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 21.
10. See, e.g., In re Linneas Areas de Nicaragua, 13 B.R. 779 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981)
(appointing an independent trustee in the United States to prevent prejudice to local creditors).
11. See Booth, supra note 6, at 138.
12. For an excellent analysis of the advantages of the harmonization of international
bankrupey law, see Thomas M. Gaa, Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law and
Practice: Is It Necessary? Is It Possible? 27 INT'L LAW. 881 (1993).
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creditors' interests. In two early cases, Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit 3 and
In re Berthoud,14 American courts refused to grant comity to pending foreign
bankruptcy proceedings. In fact, throughout most of the 1900s courts relied on
an interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure that protected American creditors' interests at the
expense of promoting comity. 5 However, as the frequency and complexity of
transnational insolvencies increased, the need for revision of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 became clear. In 1974, the collapse of the German bank Bankhaus
I.D. Herstatt revealed the inadequacies of the existing code structure. 6
Observers recognized that a more comprehensive framework for dealing with
transnational insolvencies was necessary in order to resolve future conflicts.' 7
B. The 1978 Revision of the Bankruptcy Act and § 304
In 1978, Congress revised the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.18 Responding to

13. 208 U.S. 570 (1908). In Disconto the Court acknowledged "the well-recognized rule
between states and nations which permits a country to first protect the rights of its own citizens
in local property before permitting it to be taken out of the jurisdiction for administration in favor
of those residing beyond their borders." Id. at 582 (emphasis added).
14. 231 F. 529 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 238 F. 797 (2d. Cir. 1916).
15. Prior to 1978, Rule 119 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and § 2(a)(22) of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 dictated how courts should handle foreign bankruptcy proceedings.
Bankruptcy Rule 119 stated:
When a proceeding for the purpose of the liquidation or rehabilitation of his estate has
been commenced by or against a bankrupt in a court of competent jurisdiction without
the United States, the court of bankruptcy may, after hearing on notice to the petitioner
or petitioners and such other persons as it may direct, having regard to the rights and
convenience of local creditors and other relevant circumstances, dismiss a case or
suspend the proceedings therein under such terms as may be appropriate.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 119 (pre-1978), in NEw BANKRUPTCY RULES AND OFFICIAL BANKRUPTCY
FORMS (1974). Section 2(a)(22) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 696, 30 Stat. 544
(repealed 1978), contained similar wording. Both provisions espoused principles of comity and
creditors rights "without clearly establishing how the courts should apply these competing
theories." Rimel, supra note 6, at 458.
16. The Herstatt affair involved the failure of one of Germany's largest private banks and the
efforts of the bank'sworldwide creditors to attach its assets. Chase Manhattan Bank in New York
was the principal clearinghouse for Herstattin the United States. Chase froze Herstatt's accounts
and refused to honor payment demands on the account after receiving news of its imminent
liquidation. The German bank's creditors quickly scrambled to attach its assets and get in line to
recover over $150 million frozen in the New York account. While the parties eventually settled,
the inadequacies of the Code in providing guidance for United States courts led observers to
question its effectiveness within an international legal order. See Joseph D. Becker, International
Insolvency: The Case of Herstatt, 62 A.B.A. J. 1290 (1976).
17. See, e.g., id. at 1295; Unger, supra note 6, at 1163 ("The Herstatt affair highlighted the
underdeveloped status of United States law respecting foreign insolvency proceedings.").
18. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-989, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
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the Herstatt affair, § 304 of the Code attempted to clarify when courts should
grant an ancillary American proceeding, specifically, § 304(c). 19

Although the revised Code did not indicate which, if any, of the six factors
should be weighted more heavily, courts quickly began interpreting whether
comity or creditors' rights should control. Initially some courts continued to
espouse a territoriality approach, protecting local creditors by refusing to
recognize foreign proceedings. 0 However, beginning with a series of cases
in the early 1980s, courts began recognizing foreign proceedings and
spearheaded a movement toward a policy of deferring to notions of comity in
sister common-law jurisdictions. 2' This modem trend toward a universalism
approach was hampered by other federal court decisions that seemed to either
confuse the importance of comity as the determinative factor in a § 304
analysis' or reject it outright.'

101-1330 (1994)).
19. See supra note 3.
20. See In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 B.R. 165, 170 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (refusing to defer
to a Canadian proceeding and holding that it "must protect United States citizens' claims against
foreign judgments inconsistent with this country's well-defined and accepted policies."); In re
Linneas Areas de Nicaragua, 13 B.R. 779 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (where the court utilized §
304(c)(2) to appoint a disinterested co-trustee in the United States).
21. See Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Services AB, 773 F.2d 452, 458 (2d Cir. 1985)
(finding that "[t]he granting of comity to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding enables the assets of
a debtor to be dispersed in an equitable, orderly, and systematic manner, rather than in a
haphazard, erratic or piecemeal fashion."); In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 130 B.R. 705,
712 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that "[c]omity is inevitably the more significant factor since
the other factors ... are inherently taken into account when considering comity."), vacated on
other grounds, Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A. v. Refco F/X Assoc. (In re Koreag, Controle
et Revision S.A.), 961 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Gercke, 122 B.R. 621, 631 (Bankr. D.C.
1991) ("Federal courts should generally accord comity to a foreign court when the court is of
competent jurisdiction and according comity does not prejudice the rights of United States citizens
or violate domestic foreign policy."); In re Axona Int'l Credit and Commerce Ltd., 88 B.R. 597,
608 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that comity should be a "guiding factor" in the court's
decision), affd, 115 B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dismissed, Chemical Bank v. Togut (In
re Axona Int'l Credit & Commerce Ltd.), 924 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621,
628 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (quoting the legislative history of § 304(c): "'Principles of
international comity and respect for the judgments and laws of other nations suggest that the court
be permitted [to defer to the foreign proceeding]."' (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 325 (1978),
reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6281; S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 35 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5821)).
22. Specifically, two 1988 decisions paid lip service to considerations of comity, but seemed
to return to a method of protecting creditors' interests at the expense of recognizing the ability
of foreign common-law tribunals to fairly adjudicate insolvency proceedings. See Interpool Ltd.
v. Certain Freights of the M/V Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373, 378-80 (D.N.J. 1988) (holding that
Australian law would not sufficiently protect American creditors); In re Banco Nacional de Obras
y Servicios Plubicos, 91 B.R. 661, 667 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (refusing to defer to a sister
common-law Mexican proceeding, and stating that comity "will not be granted ... if it would
result in forcing American creditors to participate in foreign proceedings in which their claims
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While a movement toward universalism has emerged, these decisions

highlight the confusion surrounding the weight comity should be given in a
§ 304(c) analysis. The different approaches courts have taken when interpreting
§ 304 leaves little certainty whether an ancillary proceeding will be granted in
the event of a foreign insolvency. Apparently, modem courts are unlikely to
defer to a foreign proceeding if American creditors' interests are clearly
unprotected. However, it is less clear whether a U.S. court will grant an
ancillary proceeding when the foreign insolvency scheme is not clearly
prejudicial to American creditors' interests, even if that proceeding were to take
place in a similar, common-law jurisdiction. Therefore, despite the revision of
the Code in 1978 and a general movement toward a universalism approach
among courts, domestic creditors still cannot be certain that their claims will
be adjudicated under U.S. insolvency law and foreign debtors cannot be assured
that they will face only one insolvency proceedings. The result is a system that
hampers the ability of creditors and debtors to accurately evaluate the risks of
doing business across borders.
III. SOLUTIONS TO THE CONFLICT AND CONFUSION OF

§ 304

Commentators disagree as to how courts can resolve the conflict between
the universality and territoriality approaches. Recently, three authors'argued that
comity should be emphasized as the determinant factor because Congress
intended the other elements in the section to merely "temper a court's decision
as to whether to afford comity to a foreign proceeding." 24 Krause proposed
that Congress should amend § 304 to clarify that courts should consider the
existing five factors "consistent with principles of comity."'
will be treated in some manner inimical to this country's policy of equality").
23. See In re Papeleras Reunidas, S.A., 92 B.R. 584, 594 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) (interpreting
the legislative intent behind the section as insisting that "it is best [for courts] to equally consider
all of the variables of § 304(c) in determining the appropriate relief in an ancillary proceeding"
(emphasis added)).
24. Krause et al., supra note 6, at 2611. The authors also examined the legislative history of
§ 304(c) in their comment. Specifically, they noted that just prior to the enactment of § 304,
Congress added comity as a sixth factor to the section. Accordingly, this late addition should be
interpreted "as an expression of congressional intent encouraging courts to lean toward a
universality approach by giving greater deference to the foreign proceeding." Krause et al., supra
note 6, at 2594-95. The House and Senate committee reports emphasized flexibility in a § 304(c)
analysis. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 325 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6281; S.
Rep. No. 95-989, at 35 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5821.
25. Krause et al., supranote 6, at 2611. For a contrasting approach, see Stacey Allen Morales
& Barbara Ann Deutcsh, Bankruptcy Code Section 304 and U.S. Recognition of Foreign
Bankruptcies: The Tyranny of Comity, 39 Bus. LAW. 1573 (1984). Morales and Deutcsh
advocated a territorialistic approach by encouraging two changes in the judicial approach to § 304
in order for courts to better protect American creditors' interests and provide a fair and reliable
process for both domestic creditors and foreign debtors. See id. at 1595. First, courts should shift

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss5/18
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Other commentators argue against amending the statute, advocating that
courts should either resolve certain preliminary interpretation issues before
applying the factors in § 304(c)2 6 or interpret the section in accordance with
other objective criteria." Similarly, at least one commentator argues that
applying a "balancing test" analysis to § 304(c) is the most effective way to
ensure that courts are able to reserve discretion and flexibility when deciding
whether to grant comity.28
A more ambitious approach to resolving the confusion surrounding
international insolvencies is the negotiation and enforcement of deference to
treaties.29 Commentators agree that if multilateral agreements can be worked

the burden of proof to the foreign petitioner. See id. at 1595 n.125 (citing Culmer, 25 B.R. at 633,
and noting that the Culmer court seemed to indicate that American creditors bore the burden of
proving that comity should not control). Second, American courts should recognize and enforce
choice of venue clauses whenever possible. See id. at 1596.
26. See Richard A. Gitlin & Evan D. Flaschen, The International Void in the Law of
MultinationalBankruptcies, 42 Bus. LAw. 307 (1987). The authors note that the flexibility of the
section can still be preserved if courts adopt a two-step recognition process-whether to recognize
the foreign proceeding and then whether to enforce the specific decrees from the foreign proceeding-when dealing with § 304 petitions. Id. at 321-22.
27. See Booth, supra note 6. Booth proposed a two-part, multi-step interpretation of the
existing section. In an effort to promote cooperation between nations, Booth's proposal would
require American courts to first determine if the foreign representative has satisfied eight general
"threshhold" requirements. Next, the court should apply the § 304(c) factors to determine
whether comity should be extended to the foreign proceeding. In doing so, the court should defer
to the foreign adjudication if: (1) the foreign proceeding provides for the "orderly and equitable"
treatment of creditors; (2) the foreign laws and procedures are fair to all parties; and (3) if
deferral would "best assure an economical and expeditious administration" of the debtor's estate.
Id. at 231.
28. See Rimel, supra note 6, at 482. Rimel suggests that courts should adopt a combination
of the methods used by the courts in In re Gercke, 122 B.R. 621 (Bankr. D.C. 1991), and In re
Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 130 B.R. 705 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 191), vacated on other
grounds, Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A. v. Refco F/X Assoc. (In re Koreag, Controle et
Revision S.A.), 61 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1992), considering public policy and the significance of
comity while weighing each factor in § 304(c) individually. Rimel advocates that this method will
allow courts to reserve "the flexibility to weigh the competing policy considerations behind
granting comity on an individual basis, as intended by Congress." Id. at 483.
29. In 1997, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law adopted a Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvencies. Although the impact of the law will hinge on its adoption by
member nations, its objective is to foster cooperation between courts in the event of a crossborder insolvency. For a discussion of the potential impact of the Model Law, see, for example,
E. Bruce Leonard, A New Milestone in Cross-Border Insolvencies, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
July/Aug. 1997, at 20; Jeremy V. Richards, How Well Does the US. Bankruptcy Code Support
the Emerging Standards of Comity in Cross-Border Insolvencies?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct.
1997, at 20. For a brief analysis of a historic joint reoganizational hearing recently held between
United States and Canadian bankruptcy courts, see E. Bruce Leonard, A Historic Crossborder
Proceeding,AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 1998, at 12. For a general historical discussion of United
States and international efforts to harmonize commercial law, see Harold S. Burman, Harmoniza-
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out, then a more uniform and international bankruptcy system would promote
the resolution of international insolvency conflicts and assure creditors of equal
treatment regardless of the jurisdiction overseeing the insolvency proceeding."
Moreover, countries could avoid the risk of resulting disruptions to important
commercial and political relationships. 3' However, hopes for an international
treaty network among nations are unrealistic and impractical. 2 Ultimately, this
range of possible solutions requires some deference to foreign proceedings.

The question remains whether focusing on notions of comity by the courts or
negotiation of treaties should dominate efforts in this area.
IV. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND A MODEL REVISION OF § 304
A. Multinational Treaties
Although formal multinational treaties or pacts will likely best assure
creditors of equal treatment from foreign tribunals, United States courts should
proceed cautiously until those agreements are negotiated. Without the assurance
of reciprocity agreements between nations, American creditors still need the
protection of American courts from clearly unjust foreign proceedings. Because
nations must overcome immense cultural, political, and philosophical
differences, an international treaty structure that could effectively address
complex multinational insolvency situations will likely take many years to
adopt and enact. Realistically, such a far-reaching arrangement may never be
achieved.
Although insolvency harmonization may never be achieved on a truly
global scale, smaller groups of countriesmore likely could successfully
tion of InternationalBankruptcy Law: A United States Perspective, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543,
2544-47 (1996).

30. See, e.g., Gaa, supra note 12, at 882-84 (concluding that by codiflying an "international
common law of bankruptcy" into multinational bankruptcy treaties, countries can harmonize
insolvency laws and assure predictability, efficiency, equity, and finality when addressing
international insolvency disputes).
31. See id. at 883-84. Gaa notes that without a system in place that promotes the resolution
of international insolvencies, countries are risking economic and political consequences. Id.; see
also Panuska, supra note 2, at 401-02 (espousing cooperative reciprocity and universality).
32. See, e.g., Douglass G. Boshkoff, Some Gloomy Thoughts Concerning Cross-Border

Insolvencies, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 931 (1994) (noting that harmonization is unlikely to occur
because a nation's bankruptcy laws are often rooted in unique cultural philosophies and legal
principles). Instead, an ad hoc approach to the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral treaties
should be continued until lawmakers can gain a deeper understanding of the social, legal, and
political differences among nations. Id. at 939-40; see also Panuska, supra note 2, at 397-98. As
a result of the failure of past treaty proposals, Panuska suggests that United States and foreign
legislatures adopt the 1989 Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act (MIICA). Id. at 376
(citing IBA COMM. J. SECT. ON BusiNEss LAW, MODEL INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY COOPERATION ACT (MIICA) (3d draft, 1989)), reprinted in Panuska, supra note 2, app. A).
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negotiate bankruptcy treaties. Regional pacts might be agreed to when countries
have comparable legal norms, social philosophies and political systems. For
example, member countries in the North Atlantic Foreign Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) or the European Union (EU) could negotiate a uniform bankruptcy
system to address the problems that exist when bankruptcies spill over within
the confines of their respective regions.33 If countries were required to agree
to the terms of bankruptcy treaties when joining multinational trading pacts, the
uncertainty involving foreign proceedings in member states would be removed.
More importantly, initial efforts to harmonize domestic insolvency laws
between these groups could establish models for other nations. Eventually,
these types of treaty arrangements could "snowball" and indirectly encourage
other nations to join or risk losing the same level of recognition afforded
participating countries.
B. Amendment of§ 304 of the Bankruptcy Code
Until multinational treaties can be negotiated, lawmakers should amend

§ 304 of the Bankruptcy Code to "modernize" the section.34 By revising the
section to emphasize comity as the controlling element in a § 304(c) analysis,
Congress can advocate that courts should defer to foreign proceedings unless
clear prejudice or preferential treatment is shown. The revised section should
also distinguish these two elements as central to a § 304(c) analysis and
minimize the significance of the remaining three elements as additional

33. See Ian F. Fletcher, International Insolvency: A Case for Study and Treatment, 27 INT'L
LAW. 429, 443 (1993) (mentioning some of the main difficulties which develop from multilateral
approaches including "exercise of jurisdiction, and the capability of the liquidator to act in other
states and administer assets that are located there").
34. A proposed amendment of § 304(c), follows revisions are highlighted in italics:
§ 304. Cases ancillary to foreign proceedings
(c) In determining whether to grant relief under subsection (b) of this
section, the court shall be guided by what will best assure an economical and
expeditious administration of such estate, consistent with notions of
internationalcomity and respectfor the judgments and laws of other nations.
Subject to these notions, the court should consider the protection of
claim holders in the United States against clearprejudice in the processing
of claims or the possibility of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of
property of such estate.
In addition the court should consider(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such
estate;
(2) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance
with the order prescribed by title 11; and
(3) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for
the individual that such foreign proceeding concerns.
See also Krause et al., supra note 6, at 2610-11.
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elements for courts to consider. However, lawmakers should continue to allow
courts some flexibility concerning when circumstances merit the granting of an
ancillary United States proceeding." Preserving flexibility for and focusing
analysis on notions of comity requires balancing which is probably best left to
Congress.36
When amending § 304(c), Congress should acknowledge how the courts

now are analyzing cross-border conflicts in insolvency proceedings. For
example, a 1995 Bankruptcy Court decision exemplifies how courts should
analyze a request for an ancillary United States bankruptcy proceeding under
§ 304(c). In In re Houran 7 the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York refused to defer to a Jordanian bankruptcy proceeding 8 because
deference should only be given when "a reasonable degree of certainty that the
consideration of all parties' rights will be fair and impartial."39 While the
court's decision might appear to mark a return to the territoriality approach, the
unique facts of the case clearly supported the district court's refusal to defer to
the foreign proceeding.4" No language in the Hourani decision indicates that

35. The House and Senate committee reports emphasized that the § 304(c) factors were
"designed to give the court the maximum flexibility in handling ancillary cases" and that courts
should "be permitted to make the appropriate orders under all of the circumstances of each case,
rather than being provided with inflexible rules." See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 325 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6281; S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 35 (1978), reprintedin 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6281. Without the certainty of bilateral pacts between nations, American
creditors still need the protection of United States bankruptcy law. However, an argument can be
made for the efficiencies created by domestic bankruptcy law that mandated deferral to all foreign
insolvency proceedings. Mandatory deferral to a bankruptcy proceeding in the home country of
the foreign debtor would force domestic creditors to evaluate credit risks and investment decisions
based on a careful analysis of the bankruptcy scheme of the foreign debtor's home country.
Because the recognition and enforcement problems associated with ancillary proceedings would
be removed, both creditors and debtors could reduce the transaction costs associated with multiple
proceedings. See Gaa, supra note 12, at 886 (noting that creditors cannot maximize recovery and
debtors cannot fully realize all benefits available to them under the bankruptcy laws if judgments
are not enforced or recognized in other forums).
36. But see supra note 28.
37. 180 B.R. 58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
38. Id. at 70.

39. Id. at 64.
40. Specifically, the liquidation of the Jordanian Petra Bank was governed by special
legislation and its affairs managed by a Jordanian Economic Security Committee. The court found
that the resolutions lacked adequate procedural and substantive safeguards while granting the
Committee substantial power to dispose of the bank's assets and claims. Id. at 62, 66. The Resolutions also nullified the applicability of Jordanian Commercial Law or Civil Law to any insolvency
proceeding involving the bank. Id. at 66. Interestingly, the court emphasized that the Petra
Resolutions differed substantially from the provisions of the Jordanian insolvency statutes
concerning a number of important safeguards, including a notice and claims processing procedure,
a provision for the recovery of preferences and fraudulent conveyances, and a right of appeal for
creditors. In fact, the court explicitly limited its analysis to the Petra Resolutions and affirmatively
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the court was interested in protecting local creditor's rights at the expense of
promoting comity. The Hourani court plainly stated that "[t]his court leans
towards a 'universality' approach to international insolvency issues." 41
However, the court added that "[w]hile this nation's preparedness to grant
deference to the laws and proceedings of other countries is considerable, it is

not unlimited."4" Instead of merely paying lip service to notions of international comity, the Hourani court balanced the competing interests involved,
emphasizing that American ancillary proceedings will not be granted absent
circumstances involving clear and unfair prejudice to creditors' interests.
V. CONCLUSION

Much has changed in the international business world since Congress
revised the Bankruptcy Code twenty years ago. The complexity of modem
international business relationships will continue to contribute to a greater
number of cross-border insolvencies. Because the current Code fails to clearly
indicate how much significance courts should give to notions of international
comity in a § 304(c) analysis, different courts are using different standards
when determining whether American creditors should be entitled to ancillary
relief.
Congress should amend the section to emphasize that comity should be the
controlling element in a § 304(c) analysis unless local creditors prove that their
interests would be clearly prejudiced by an unfair and impartial foreign
adjudication. Because a single proceeding consolidates all claims against the
debtor, deference to a fair foreign proceeding may be the best way for courts
to assure "an economical and expeditious administration of [an] estate."'43 By
revising the statute to clarify Congress's intent to focus on notions of comity,
parties to the litigation, practitioners, and multinational business concerns can
take comfort in more consistent federal court decisions. Moreover, by
embracing the movement toward a universality approach, Congress and the
courts encourage other countries to favor comity in cross-border insolvency
disputes. In this way, perhaps nations can move toward the gradual harmonization of international bankruptcy laws, assuring predictability and finality when
insolvencies spill across borders. By emphasizing notions of international
comity subject to the protection of domestic claim holders against clear
prejudice or preferences inconsistent with U.S. bankruptcy law in the proposed

took no position as to the availability of ancillary relief based upon other proceedings under
different law. Id. at 70. The implication is that the court would not have granted the ancillary
proceeding had the liquidation taken place under Jordanian insolvency statutes. For an in-depth
discussion of In re Hourani, see Krause et al., supra note 6, at 2605-09.
41. In re Hourani, 180 B.R. at 63.
42. Id. at 64.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1994).
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amendment," courts will be required to balance these two critical elements in
a § 304(c) analysis.
James Garrett Van Osdell

44. See supra note 34.
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